In this paper, we study an optimal portfolio, consumption-leisure and retirement choice problem for an infinitely lived economic agent with a CES utility function. Using the dynamic programming method, we obtain the value function and optimal investment, consumption, leisure, and retirement strategies in analytic form. Numerically we observe that the threshold retirement wealth level is an increasing function with respect to the elasticity of substitution.
Introduction
We consider an optimal portfolio and consumption-leisure choice problem of an infinitely lived economic agent with a voluntary retirement option and a CES utility function of consumption and leisure. The agent can choose her labor supply flexibly above a certain minimum level in accordance with the trade-off between utility from leisure and labor income. The economic agent receives labor income proportional to the amount of labor supplied before retirement and enjoys full leisure after retirement at the cost of labor income.
Bodie et al. [] investigated the influence of the labor supply flexibility on portfolio and consumption choice under the lifetime portfolio and consumption choice model of Merton [, ]. Farhi and Panageas [] studied the optimal portfolio, consumption and retirement choice problem of an economic agent with a Cobb-Douglas utility function and a binomial leisure rate process (l  before retirement andl after retirement) using the martingale method. Shin [] solved the problem using the dynamic programming method, and Koo et al. [] extended the model by allowing the leisure rate process to be chosen flexibly, also using the dynamic programming method. Borrowing constraints have significant effects on an economic agent's optimal portfolio, consumption and retirement choice, and this is well documented in the literature, for example, Dybvig and Liu [] . Barucci and Marazzina [] also considered borrowing constraints with stochastic labor income in solving optimal consumption, investment, labor supply and retirement choice problem through a duality approach. Choi et al. [] extended Farhi and Panageas [] by employing a general CES utility function, which has the Cobb-Douglas utility function as a special case, and by allowing a continuum between labor and leisure. In Choi et al. [] , the martingale method is used to provide an analytic form for the value function and optimal strategies.
We revisit the optimization problem of Choi et al.
[] to give some methodological contributions and supply some numerical results which were not considered therein. We use the dynamic programming approach based on Karatzas et al. [] to derive the closedform solutions including the value function and optimal strategies. Since our optimization problem utilizes CES utility, it is important to investigate the effect of the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure on the optimal policies. Numerically we observe that the threshold retirement wealth level is an increasing function with respect to the elasticity of substitution. This is due to the fact that an economic agent with a large elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure may consume more and enjoy higher utility than an economic agent with a small elasticity of substitution when the optimal leisure rate reaches the maximum leisure rate allowed while working. We also show that our results converge to those with Cobb-Douglas utility in Koo et al. [] as the elasticity of substitution goes to .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  sets up the economic model. In Section , we solve the optimization problem using the dynamic programming method. Section  provides numerical examples with a limiting case, and Section  concludes.
The economy
In the financial market, we assume that the agent has investment opportunities given by a riskless asset with a constant interest rate r > , and one risky asset S t whose price evolves according to the following stochastic differential equation: dS t /S t = μ dt + σ dB t , where μ is a constant mean rate of return, σ is a constant volatility, and B t is a standard Brownian motion on a probability space ( , F, P). {F t } t≥ is the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by the standard Brownian motion {B t } t≥ .
Let π t be the amount of money invested in the risky asset at time t, c t ≥  be the agent's consumption rate process at time t, and l t ≥  be the agent's leisure rate process at time t. π t , c t , and l t are all F t -progressively measurable and satisfy the following technical conditions:
Let τ be the (voluntary) retirement time from labor which will be considered as an optimal stopping time. The assumptions for the leisure rate process l t are given by
where L,L are constants (see Choi et al. [] and Koo et al. [] ). Let w be the constant wage rate. Then w(L -l t ) >  is the labor income rate at time t (< τ ) resulting from the laborleisure choice before retirement. However, since we choose l t =L at time t (≥ τ ), there is no labor income after retirement, that is, w(L -l t ) ≡ . Therefore the agent's wealth process x t at time t, with a given initial endowment x  = x, evolves according to the following stochastic differential equation:
A quadruple (c, π , l, τ ) is called admissible at initial capital x  = x > -wL/r if x t > -wL/r and  ≤ l t ≤ L for  ≤ t < τ , and x t ≥  for t ≥ τ , where c {c t } t≥ , π {π t } t≥ , and l {l t } t≥ .
Here wL/r can be considered as the present value of the (maximum) future labor income of the agent.
The optimization problem
In this paper, we assume that the utility function u(·, ·) is of the CES type as follows:
where γ is the agent's coefficient of relative risk aversion for consumption and leisure, α is a measurement of consumption's contribution to the agent's utility, and /( -ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. The agent's optimization problem is to maximize the following expected discounted utility:
where β >  is the subjective discount rate and
Thus the agent's optimization problem is given by
where A(x) is the set of all admissible quadruples at x > .
Remark . For later use, we define a quadratic algebraic equation as follows:
where θ (μ -r)/σ is the market price of the risk. Because g() <  and g(-) < , it follows that the quadratic equation g(n) =  has two real roots n  and n  satisfying n  >  and n  < -. Also, we define p  n  +  and p  n  + .
Now we provide the following assumption that holds throughout the paper and guarantees the optimization problem (.) will be well defined.
Before retirement (t < τ ), we derive the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation for the value function V (x) by using the dynamic programming principle:
We 
Let us define
where (c 
Proof Let us define a function W (·, ·) as follows:
Applying Itô's rule to W (t, x t ) gives us
for  ≤ t < τ * , where the inequality comes from HJB equation (.) and
for any s ≥ . Since the second integral of the right-hand side of (.) is a bounded local martingale and hence a martingale, we obtain
for any admissible control (c, π, l, τ * ) ∈ A(x). Letting s ↑ ∞ and using the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, we have 
c can be determined from the following algebraic equation:
and I L (·) is the inverse function of u L (·).x is given bȳ x =X(c) =X C (x) , whereC(·) is the inverse function ofX(·).
We then obtain B  as follows:
and A  can be determined by
The threshold wealth levelx is given bỹ
where
C(·) is the inverse function of X(·), and C L (·) is the inverse function of X L (·).
Proof Due to the constraint l t ≤ L for t < τ , we introduce another wealth threshold level x such that HJB equation (.) can be split into
for -wL/r < x <x, where
are obtained from the first order conditions (FOCs), and
forx ≤ x <x, where
are also obtained from the first order conditions (FOCs). Here h is a constant defined in (.).
In order to solve HJB equation (.), we consider the optimal consumption c as a function of the agent's wealth x by writing c = C(x), and suppose that C(·) has an inverse function X(·). Then we have
and we can rewrite HJB equation (.) as follows:
whereh is a constant defined in (.). We differentiate (.) with respect to c to obtain the following second-order ordinary differential equation (ODE):
The general solution to ODE (.) is given by
where A  is some constant and K is a constant defined in (.) (A  will be determined later). Substituting (.) into (.), we have
Similarly, we introduce a function X L (·) such that the agent's wealth x = X L (c) and its inverse function C L (·) such that the optimal consumption c = C L (x) to solve HJB equation (.). Then we obtain
and
If we differentiate (.) with respect to c, then we obtain
The variation of parameters method for ODE (.) provides us with a particular solution
The general solution to ODE (.) is then given by
where B  and B  are some constants to be determined later. Plugging (.) into (.) gives rise to
After retirement, we derive the value function V (x) = U(x) =J(C(x)) from Karatzas et al. [] , where a functionX(·) and its inverse functionC(·) are given such that the agent's wealth x =X(c) and the optimal consumption c =C(x), andX(c) andJ(c) are defined in (.). Now we are going to determine the coefficients A  , B  , B  and the wealth boundariesx andx. First, we use the continuity of V (x) at x =x. We then have
from which we obtain the relatioñ
wherec is the optimal consumption rate corresponding tox, that is,x = X(c). Also the continuity of V (x) at x =x implies
By (.) and (.), we obtaiñ
Combining (.), (.), and the fact u L (c) = (α + h)
Second, we use the smooth-pasting condition of V (x) at x =x to determinex andc, wherec is the optimal consumption rate corresponding tox. Since the leisure rate is discontinuous at x =x, we conjecture that there arec L andc (c L =c) such that
(.)
Thus we havē
from (.) and (.), respectively. From (.) and (.), we have
The C  -condition of V (x) at x =x and FOCs (.) give us
Ifc is obtained from (.), thenc L is also obtained from (.). Thus we can getx from (.). From (.) and (.), we also derive
FOCs (.) and (.) give us the following optimal strategies.
Theorem . The optimal strategies (c * , l * , π * , τ * ) are given by
Remark . The optimal strategies (c * , l * , π * , τ * ) in Theorem . are the same as those in Theorem . from Choi et al. [] . Although it is difficult to obtain an explicit transformation between them, simple but tedious calculations show that they are equivalent.
Numerical examples and Cobb-Douglas utility
In this section, we present numerical examples and a limiting case ρ → , that is, the elasticity of substitution goes to . In this case, our CES utility function becomes a CobbDouglas utility function.
In Figure  , we see that there exists a discontinuity of the optimal consumption at the threshold wealth level x =x. This result is similar to In Figure  , we observe that the critical wealth levelx is an increasing function with respect to the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, /( -ρ). In this model, retirement incentive is derived from a large leisure rate while not working. Before retirement, an economic agent's leisure rate is upper limited by L, and when the leisure rate at which the economic agent optimally enjoys reaches L, she is forced to reduce leisure and to increase consumption to retain the utility. In this situation, an economic agent with a large elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure may consume more and enjoy higher utility than an economic agent with a small elasticity of substitution. So the former has a larger incentive to stay working and a higher threshold retirement wealth level than the latter and tends to delay retirement.
Let us investigate a limiting case. A Cobb-Douglas utility function is defined by
-γ  -γ , <α < , γ >  and γ = , which is a special case of a CES utility function given in (.) due to the fact that 
